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Abstract
Background: Individual strategies in pandemic preparedness plans may not reduce the impact of
an influenza pandemic.
Methods: We searched modeling publications through PubMed and associated references from
1990 to 30 September 2009. Inclusion criteria were modeling papers quantifying the effectiveness
of combination strategies, both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical.
Results: Nineteen modeling papers on combination strategies were selected. Four studies
examined combination strategies on a global scale, 14 on single countries, and one on a small
community. Stochastic individual-based modeling was used in nine studies, stochastic meta-
population modeling in five, and deterministic compartmental modeling in another five. As part of
combination strategies, vaccination was explored in eight studies, antiviral prophylaxis and/or
treatment in 16, area or household quarantine in eight, case isolation in six, social distancing
measures in 10 and air travel restriction in six studies. Two studies suggested a high probability of
successful influenza epicenter containment with combination strategies under favorable conditions.
During a pandemic, combination strategies delayed spread, reduced overall number of cases, and
delayed and reduced peak attack rate more than individual strategies. Combination strategies
remained effective at high reproductive numbers compared with single strategy. Global cooperative
strategies, including redistribution of antiviral drugs, were effective in reducing the global impact
and attack rates of pandemic influenza.
Conclusion: Combination strategies increase the effectiveness of individual strategies. They
include pharmaceutical (antiviral agents, antibiotics and vaccines) and non-pharmaceutical
interventions (case isolation, quarantine, personal hygiene measures, social distancing and travel
restriction). Local epidemiological and modeling studies are needed to validate efficacy and
feasibility.
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Background
Many countries have developed pandemic preparedness
plans in response to the threat from pandemic influenza
[1], to attempt containment of the virus or to reduce the
pandemic's impact. The influenza A (H1N1-2009) pan-
demic has underscored the importance of such plans, with
the World Health Organization (WHO) calling for the
activation of pandemic plans worldwide [2]. Although the
WHO has made public guidelines for developing pan-
demic plans [3], the comprehensiveness and standards of
pandemic plans differ widely across different countries
and continents [4-6]. To ensure the success of these plans,
it is necessary to adopt a combination of different strate-
gies.
Although there are existing historical data on the possible
success of strategies used in previous pandemics such as
personal hygiene, school and workplace closures, and
social distancing, these are often anecdotal and difficult to
interpret [7,8]. Mathematical models provide a platform
for the assessment of multiple interventions in an envi-
ronment where individual parameters can be altered. The
recent increase in mathematical modeling studies on pan-
demic interventions suggests the effectiveness of these
strategies and provides guidance for policy makers.
Although the 2009 pandemic has spread rapidly, these
combination strategies can be applied in populations yet
to be severely affected, for the second wave, or for the next
pandemic [9,10]. This systematic review aims to deter-
mine the individual components that constitute combina-
tion strategies, and the quantitative impact of these
combination strategies in reducing pandemic spread and
morbidity.
Methods
This study explored available mathematical modeling
publications on the effectiveness of combination strate-
gies for an influenza pandemic. To obtain papers on the
effectiveness of combination strategies, data for this
review were identified by the authors through searches of
the PubMed search engine for English language articles
and articles translated into the English language. The
authors used the following search terms to focus on mod-
eling studies, and those which had a focus on pandemic
preparedness and strategies - influenza and pandemic and
(preparedness or strateg* or model*); influenza and modeling
or modelling. The search included all published articles
listed on PubMed from 1990 to 30 September 2009 -
there were few articles on influenza pandemic planning or
modeling before this period.
Abstracts were reviewed where available to determine if a
study met the inclusion criteria and the full manuscript
was obtained for further scrutiny. Snowball searches by
hand were performed on the reference lists of articles
meeting the inclusion criteria to find additional studies.
The inclusion criteria were primary mathematical mode-
ling papers that compared and reported the quantitative
effectiveness of combination strategies (two or more strat-
egies used together) versus individual strategies for
human pandemic influenza. Mathematical modeling
papers were those which used quantitative predictive
methods to determine the likely impact of strategies, and
had descriptions of these methods which could be repro-
duced or verified. All influenza preparedness strategies
were considered, including pharmaceutical and non-
pharmaceutical public health strategies. These articles
would allow clear comparison on the advantages of com-
bination strategies over and above the impact of individ-
ual strategies. An explanation of some of the key strategies
are found in the appendix.
Mathematical modeling articles that described the effec-
tiveness of multiple singular strategies but did not analyze
the quantitative effect of combination strategies were
excluded. Articles that referred to general pandemic pre-
paredness without quantitative evidence, or provided
only qualitative discussion were also excluded. Reviews
without primary data, articles in abstracts without full
publication, and unpublished studies were excluded as
their methodology and results could not be verified.
Mathematical models are based on input variables which
are assumptions made based on available evidence in spe-
cific scenarios. One important assumption is the repro-
ductive number (Ro), which is the average number of
secondary infections generated by a single case in a com-
pletely susceptible population. No attempt was made in
this review to homogenize data across studies for compar-
ison; on the contrary, the heterogeneity of data provides
public health professionals with evidence of the effective-
ness of strategies across a wide range of assumptions and
scenarios. We have instead listed the different types of
models used, and the scenarios, interventions, and coun-
tries where they were applied.
Results
The search yielded a total of 1,920 papers including over-
laps. Of these, 162 used mathematical modeling tech-
niques and on closer review, 144 were excluded based on
the exclusion criteria listed in Methods. The remaining 18
studies were included for analysis, together with one addi-
tional study identified from the snowball searches (Figure
1). The selected modeling papers that show the effective-
ness of combination strategies in increasing the impact of
individual strategies are listed in Additional files 1 and
2[11]. The following sections highlight key findings on
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the effectiveness of combination strategies in these mode-
ling studies on pandemic influenza.
Source containment
Zoonotic influenza such as H5N1 influenza is endemic in
several countries, and there is interest in containing a
highly virulent pandemic at the earliest sign of localized
efficient human-to-human transmission. Two key mode-
ling studies suggested a high probability of success for
rapid containment of an influenza epicenter with combi-
nation strategies under favorable conditions [9,10]. These
studies formed the basis for the epicenter containment
strategies recommended by the WHO. Longini showed
that antiviral prophylaxis alone could contain a pandemic
influenza virus with reproductive number (Ro) less than
1.7; while 70% household quarantine alone was effective
up to Ro of 1.7. A combination of quarantine and anti-
viral prophylaxis was effective up to Ro of 2.1; while a
combination of pre-pandemic vaccination, household
quarantine and antiviral prophylaxis was effective for Ro
of 2.4 [9]. Ferguson found that antiviral prophylaxis for
contacts only would have a 90% chance of containing a
virus with a Ro less than 1.25, while antiviral prophylaxis
for contacts and all individuals in a 10 km zone would
have a 90% chance with Ro less than 1.7 [10]. Combined
anti-viral prophylaxis and either school and workplace
closures or area quarantine provided a similar chance of
containment with Ro of 1.7 to 1.8, while a combination
of all three strategies would contain a virus with Ro of 1.9
and allow for greater initial surveillance errors [10].
Reducing pandemic spread
Combination strategies can be used to reduce the global
spread of the influenza virus [12,13]. Redistribution of
limited antiviral drugs can help contain pandemics or
reduce the global attack rate (AR) [12]. If global antiviral
stockpiles are limited, non-cooperative strategies where
countries keep their antiviral stockpiles for their own use
can only contain a pandemic influenza virus with Ro less
than 1.5; in contrast, if redistribution of 25% of stockpiles
from countries that have them to countries that do not, a
pandemic with Ro up to 1.9 may be contained, and over-
all AR reduced by 25% at higher Ro [12].
Another example of combination strategy is reduction of
pandemic spread through air travel. Suspension of 99.9%
of air travel can only delay individual national epidemics
by up to four months, while a combination of local strat-
egies reducing influenza transmission by 40% can delay
pandemic spread by up to 10 months [13]. A combina-
tion of vaccination and travel restrictions may delay epi-
demic growth, allowing vaccination of susceptible
individuals [14]. With a pandemic starting in July in Asia,
the number of United States (US) metropolitan cases was
102.4 million - 0.1% daily vaccination alone reduced this
to 73.0 million, and vaccination together with travel
restriction reduced this to 56.9 million [14].
Combination strategies may have substantial impact in
reducing the global spread of resistant viruses. For exam-
ple, if the probability of emergence of anti-viral drug
resistance was 1%, antiviral monotherapy was associated
with overall AR of 67% and resistant AR (RAR) of 38%
[15]. In contrast, early combination chemotherapy was
associated with reduced AR of 58% and RAR of 2%, while
sequential multi-drug chemotherapy was associated with
AR of 57% and RAR of 3%.
Mitigating pandemic impact
During the pandemic, several studies found that combi-
nation strategies delayed the spread of the virus, reduced
the overall number of cases, and delayed and reduced the
peak AR much more than individual strategies which may
be ineffective if used alone [16-19].
A study using individual-based modelling in the United
Kingdom and United States examined the effects of anti-
viral treatment and prophylaxis, vaccination, case isola-
tion, household quarantine, school and workplace
closure and travel restrictions in pandemics with Ro of 1.7
to 2.0. It found that external or internal travel restrictions
alone would delay spread by two to three weeks only if
more than 99% effective [16]. Reactive school and work-
Flow diagram for selection of combination strategy modeling studiesigure 1
Flow diagram for selection of combination strategy 
modeling studies.
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place closures alone did not impact on overall AR, but
reduced peak AR by about 40%; antiviral treatment and
prophylaxis within the household reduced overall AR by
35% and peak AR by 45%.; while household quarantine
alone reduced overall AR by 10% and peak AR by 20%.
Combination antiviral treatment and prophylaxis, and
household quarantine reduced overall AR by 40% and
peak AR by 60%. Combination school and workplace clo-
sure, antiviral treatment and prophylaxis, and household
quarantine reduced overall AR by more than 60% and
peak AR by more than 80%. Combination antiviral treat-
ment and prophylaxis, school closure and 20% pre-pan-
demic vaccination reduced overall AR by more than 60%
and peak AR by more than 75%. Combination antiviral
treatment and prophylaxis, household quarantine, school
and workplace closure, and effective border control
reduced overall AR by more than 70% and peak AR by
more than 90% [16].
Similarly, another individual-based stochastic simulation
model in Chicago evaluating the effects of antiviral treat-
ment and prophylaxis, quarantine, isolation, school clo-
sure, community and workplace social distancing showed
that social distancing alone may reduce overall AR by 60%
for pandemic Ro of 1.9 but combination antiviral treat-
ment and prophylaxis, quarantine, social distancing, and
school closure could reduce overall AR by more than 90%
for similar pandemic Ro of 1.9 [17].
Another study in France examined the effects of antiviral
treatment and household prophylaxis, vaccination,
household quarantine, school and workplace closure at
the individual and community level [20]. Treatment only
with anti-viral drugs did not affect AR substantially. Anti-
viral prophylaxis of 90% of household contacts reduced
AR by 50%. Vaccination of 70% of the population within
one day reduced AR by 80%. A combination of antiviral
treatment and prophylaxis, and household quarantine
reduced AR by 90% [20].
An Australian individual-based stochastic simulation
model assessed the effects of non-pharmacological pan-
demic mitigation measures of case isolation, school clo-
sure, workplace non-attendance and community contact
reduction [21]. For a pandemic with Ro of two, school
closures alone reduced AR by 20%, case isolation by 40%,
workplace non-attendance by 15%, and social distancing
by 25%. In contrast, combination of all these measures
reduced AR by more than 95% [21].
A deterministic compartment model using InfluSim based
on a small community of 100,000 population assessing
the effects of antiviral treatment, case isolation and social
distancing showed that case isolation and social distanc-
ing could reduce overall AR by 25%, and antiviral treat-
ment alone by 20%, compared with a reduction of 40%
with a combination of case isolation, social distancing
and antiviral treatment [18]. The triple combination strat-
egy could delay the peak by one month compared with 10
days for the first two strategies [18].
Another study using a deterministic model with a stochas-
tic simulation component based on Italy examined the
effects of household antiviral prophylaxis, pre-pandemic
vaccination, and social distancing via closure of all
schools, public offices and public meeting places [22]. In
a pandemic with an attack rate of 35%, vaccination alone
reduced AR by up to 10% even at vaccine efficacy levels of
70%; antiviral prophylaxis alone for even the entire pan-
demic duration reduced AR by up to 6% only; and social
distancing alone reduced AR by less than 1%. However, a
combination of all three measures reduced AR by up to
30% [22].
Intervention effectiveness with changes in Ro
The relative success of interventions depends on the trans-
missibility of the pandemic, which is commonly reflected
in the Ro. In an influenza pandemic with higher Ro, the
effectiveness of interventions is reduced and individual
interventions are commonly ineffective. However, across
most scenarios, combination strategies maintain some
effectiveness as shown clearly in the studies on contain-
ment by Longini [9] and Ferguson [10].
A stochastic agent-based discrete-time simulation model
in the United States examining the effect of antiviral
prophylaxis, vaccination, school closure and travel restric-
tion found that for a pandemic influenza virus with Ro of
2.4, unlimited antiviral prophylaxis and best vaccination
program may reduce cases by 64% and 34% respectively,
while school closure within seven days of pandemic onset
may reduce cases by 14%, social distancing within seven
days by 6%, and travel restrictions exceeding 90% was
ineffective [19]. However, a combination strategy of all of
these measures may reduce cases by 99.8% [19]. The effec-
tiveness of any strategy in delaying the pandemic or reduc-
ing the AR is highly dependent on the Ro. For example, for
a pandemic with Ro of 1.6, individual strategies of proph-
ylaxis, vaccination, or school closures had very high effec-
tiveness [19]. However, once the Ro increased beyond 2.0
(which is similar to the Ro for the 1918 pandemic), indi-
vidual strategies were much less effective, whereas combi-
nation strategies still maintained effectiveness across a
range of Ro.
An individual-based model in Italy assessing the effects of
household, school and workplace antiviral prophylaxis,
vaccination, international air travel restriction, social dis-
tancing via school closure and closure of some public
offices showed that without any interventions, importa-
tion of pandemic influenza would occur 37 to 77 days
after the first case elsewhere in the world. Air travel restric-
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tion would delay introduction by one week to one month.
For a pandemic with Ro of 1.7, travel restriction and social
distancing did not affect overall AR, household prophy-
laxis reduced AR by 50%, and vaccination reduced AR by
0 to 40%. A combination of antiviral prophylaxis, social
distancing, vaccination, and travel restriction reduced AR
by more than 90% [23]. For a pandemic with Ro of 2.0,
travel restriction in fact increased overall AR by 1% and
peak AR by 20%. Household prophylaxis reduced AR by
35%, while vaccination reduced AR by 0 to 30%. A com-
bination of antiviral prophylaxis, social distancing, vacci-
nation, and travel restriction reduced AR by 80%.
Disadvantages of individual measures
An individual-based stochastic model in Hong Kong look-
ing at the effects of antiviral prophylaxis, case isolation
and household quarantine reported that in a pandemic
with Ro of 1.8 and AR of 74%, household quarantine
could reduce AR to 49%; household quarantine and isola-
tion to 43%; household quarantine with anti-viral proph-
ylaxis to 44%; household quarantine, isolation and anti-
viral prophylaxis to 40% which was recommended.
Although adding contact tracing and quarantine of all
contacts to the latter combination strategy reduced AR to
34%, the number of people under quarantine would be
excessive. Therefore, contact tracing was not recom-
mended [24].
Another study examining the effects of antiviral treatment
and prophylaxis, home quarantine and social distancing
based on a community of a million population with the
assumption that pandemic influenza was introduced by
an undetected airline passenger, found that if a pandemic
Ro was 3.0, individual interventions would result in
increased transmission while combination measures may
break community transmission [25]. This was similarly
shown by Ciofi and colleagues for a pandemic with Ro of
2.0 [23].
A deterministic compartmental model evaluating the
effects of antiviral treatment and prophylaxis, vaccination,
case isolation and air traffic reduction globally demon-
strated that individual strategies such as case isolation and
air travel restrictions may result in higher peak AR even
though overall AR could be reduced [26].
A study in Taiwan evaluated the effects of enhanced venti-
lation, use of respiratory mask and vaccination on pan-
demic influenza transmission in a school [27].
Vaccination alone of 80% of children was effective in pre-
venting the spread of the virus but this was only if a suita-
ble vaccine was available, which is often not the situation.
A combination of masks and ventilation, or a combina-
tion of vaccination and masks achieved similar effective-
ness [27].
Discussion
Many modeling studies were performed as a result of
H5N1 influenza threat and an impending pandemic, but
all have used parameters based on historical pandemics
and existing studies on the influenza transmission. In
addition, these studies provided sensitivity analyses across
a wide range of influenza parameters. As such, they are
directly relevant to the 2009 influenza pandemic which
has an Ro of between 1.2 to 1.6 [28], similar to the 1957
and 1968 influenza pandemic [16], and for future pan-
demics. At the same time, the 2009 influenza pandemic
provides the opportunity to study unknown variables to
validate and refine these models.
All of these modeling studies in various settings, and
using different models and assumptions, consistently
show that combination strategies are more effective com-
pared to individual strategies. Given the lack of good
experimental, observation or controlled studies on these
strategies, and the difficulties of performing trials during a
pandemic, it is difficult for policy makers to know the
effectiveness of their policies. These modeling studies pro-
vide policy makers with a suggestion of the effectiveness
of different combination strategies. At the same time, new
models will have to be developed using local data to pro-
vide realistic outcomes for local settings. The diverse
methodology available from these studies provides suffi-
cient information for countries to build and validate their
results locally.
Although the use of individual-based and other stochastic
models provide better data resolution, deterministic mod-
els mentioned in this review show similar outcomes
[18,22,23,27]. These deterministic or simple stochastic
compartmental models are much easier to build and may
provide rapid results for policy making. This is especially
true in countries where the vast amounts of data required
for individual-based and complex stochastic models may
not be available compared with high-income countries
where most sophisticated models were built.
The use of combination strategies necessitates the availa-
bility of resources and feasibility for each individual com-
ponent. For example, stockpiling of pharmaceutical
agents is an integral part of preparedness plans and cur-
rently widely adopted in well-resourced countries. The
increase in anti-viral drug resistance underscores the
importance of combination drug use and provides policy
makers with recommendations for their stockpiles [15].
Combination stockpiles of sufficient amounts of different
antiviral drugs such as oseltamivir, zanamivir and ada-
mantanes will allow for early combination chemotherapy
or sequential multidrug therapy which was modeled to be
effective against antiviral resistance when a small second-
ary stockpile was used to augment a primary stockpile
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[15]. The United States Federal stockpile is composed of
80% oseltamivir and 20% zanamivir, and several million
doses of rimantadine from previous stockpiles [29]. The
United Kingdom has purchased additional antiviral drugs
to ensure it has a total stockpile for 50% of its population,
comprising 68% oseltamivir and 32% zanamivir [30].
Bacterial pneumonia results in substantial morbidity and
mortality among pandemic influenza cases [31,32]. Anti-
biotics should therefore be considered for stockpiling
[31]. Stockpiles should take into account common locally
circulating bacteria, and recommended amounts range
from 10 to 25% of the population [33]. In contrast to anti-
viral drugs that are not widely used, antibiotics can be part
of a rolling stockpile which ensures sufficient stockpiles
without expiry issues. Vaccination against bacterial infec-
tions should likewise be considered.
From the effectiveness of combination strategies in reduc-
ing global spread of influenza or resistant viruses [12-15],
resource-rich countries should consider redistributing
their resources for the greater global benefit and their own
benefit if they have yet to be affected by the pandemic.
Controlling local outbreaks through combination strate-
gies can reduce global spread, and countries affected early
during the pandemic should be provided with assistance
[13].
Vaccines are part of many combination strategies and
modeling has shown that introduction of a vaccine four
months after the pandemic virus has arrived has limited
effectiveness, while stockpiling prototype pandemic vac-
cines could reduce overall AR [16]. Therefore countries
were stockpiling H5N1 vaccines as candidate pandemic
vaccines [34,35]. However, if the pandemic influenza
virus is totally different from the vaccine virus, the vac-
cines would be of negligible effectiveness. Investments are
needed to develop new vaccines with greater cross-protec-
tion against conserved viral regions; vaccine libraries to
quickly produce candidate vaccines; better adjuvants and
antigen-sparing strategies to increase production capacity;
and modes of administration for improved immuno-
genicity and cross- protection [36,37].
Although some individual strategies may seem very effec-
tive, they may not be feasible and models assist policy
makers in avoiding potentially disastrous decisions.
Social distancing has been widely used in epidemics [7]
but their impact remains unclear and highly dependent
on disease severity, transmission, and risk groups affected.
Local interventions such as school closures may be effec-
tive if done early, decisively, and for prolonged periods
[20,38-40]. A United Kingdom model based on a 1957-
like pandemic showed more than 20% case reduction if
the Ro were low (<2) and schools were closed early, but
less than 10% case reduction in pandemics with high Ro
[38]. A French study showed that prolonged closure and
limiting contact among children outside school may
reduce cases by 17% and peak AR by 45% [39]. However,
school closures and limiting social contact may be socio-
economically difficult to achieve. Another study found
that total closure of schools and workplaces reduced AR
by 95%. However, the socio-economic impact would be
unimaginable [20]. Similarly, most modeling studies
found that travel restrictions alone did not impact overall
AR [13,16,19,23]. Reducing air travel has been modeled
to be effective in delaying pandemic spread if nearly 100%
reduction can be achieved [13,16], and will be difficult if
not impossible to achieve [41]. If used alone, local epi-
demic severity may increase because restriction-induced
travel delays can push local outbreaks into high epidemic
season [14].
Although combination strategies are more effective than
individual measures, not all combination strategies may
be feasible. Active surveillance, isolation of cases, and
quarantine of close contacts are important interventions
during epicenter containment. These interventions may
reduce the Ro of the disease to below one and contain the
outbreak. However, it is often difficult to ensure total
compliance with these measures and if used alone, will
result in missed cases due to surveillance failures, isola-
tion facility exposures, and quarantine failures as shown
in the SARS experience [42]. A Hong Kong modeling study
found that although contact tracing and quarantine of all
contacts was effective, it was not feasible because the
number of people under quarantine would be excessive
[24]. Therefore combination strategies enable policy mak-
ers to leverage on the effectiveness of some measures and
reduce potential negative impact of others.
For combination strategies to work, they have to be tai-
lored for each scenario at organizational, community,
national, and international levels. To facilitate integration
of interventions into effective combination strategies,
more evidence is needed through targeted research, for
example, the effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical inter-
ventions (e.g. personnel cohorting, school closures or
reduction in air travel). In the absence of definitive stud-
ies, mathematical modeling studies provide an effective
means of assessing the effectiveness of these strategies.
A limitation of this study is the restriction of our searches
to the PubMed database. While we have made attempts to
include additional articles from snowball searches, there
is the potential for other published or unpublished stud-
ies to be missed from other databases and private sources.
Other intrinsic limitations of modeling studies exist, and
include the fact that they are based on theoretical epide-
miology and not fully based on clinical or epidemiologi-
cal evidence. For example, widespread use of pandemic
vaccines raises safety concerns, and widespread use of
antiviral drugs raises concern for antiviral resistance. Viral
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transmission during treatment with anti-viral drugs is also
not well understood. It is therefore important to perform
clinical and epidemiological studies during pandemic or
seasonal influenza to understand the effectiveness and
impact of these interventions. Models are also highly
dependent on the assumptions and input variables, and
are specific for a local context. However, if these limita-
tions are understood by decision makers, modeling pro-
vides a reflection of the possible outcomes, helps to
delineate possible strategies for inclusion, and avoids
costly errors.
Conclusion
Modeling studies show that combination strategies
increase the effectiveness of individual strategies, guard
against individual failures, and may reduce socio-eco-
nomic impact. In the initial phases of an influenza pan-
demic, combination strategies provide the opportunity to
contain the novel virus or delay its spread, allowing unaf-
fected areas within a country and other countries to acti-
vate preventive strategies. During a pandemic,
combination strategies allow for different strategies to
have synergistic effect in reducing the impact of pandemic
influenza, and the socio-economic impact of individual
interventions. Finally, combination strategies protect
against failure of individual interventions and should be
considered in preparedness plans.
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Appendix
Description of key variables used in the models
Reproductive number (R) - Number of secondary infec-
tions generated by a single primary infection. The basic
reproductive number (Ro) represents this number when
the entire population is susceptible.
Anti-viral treatment - Treatment of individuals infected
with influenza. Most of the studies use neuraminidase
inhibitors such as oseltamivir as the drug of choice.
Anti-viral prophylaxis - Administration of anti-viral drugs
to well contacts to prevent influenza infection. Prophy-
laxis here refers to post-exposure prophylaxis in a circum-
scribed area (household, school, workplace, geographical
area).
Vaccination - Administration of an influenza vaccine to
prevent influenza infections.
Quarantine - Segregation of well individuals exposed to
influenza to prevent spread. Area quarantine is segrega-
tion of a geographical area with influenza cases within.
Household quarantine is segregation of the household
where a case has occurred.
Travel restrictions - Reduction in travel (air or border
travel) by a quantum mentioned in the text.
Social distancing - Reduction in contact through strategies
such as school and workplace closures, travel reductions,
reduction in mass gatherings, behavioral changes in
reducing contact, as mentioned in the text.
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